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Abstract 
Given the important conceptual connections between cause and coincidence as well as the extensive 
prior research on causality asking, “how causal is this?”, the present research proposes and evaluated 
a psychological construction of coincidentality as the answer to the question, “how coincidental is 
this?” Four experiments measured the judgment properties of a reasonably large set of real 
coincidences from an initial diary study. These judgements included coincidentality and an array of 
other judgments about event uncertainty, hypothesis belief and surprise as predictors of 
coincidentality consistent with and supporting our prior definition of coincidence (Johansen & 
Osman, 2015): “coincidences are surprising pattern repetitions that are observed to be unlikely by 
chance but are nonetheless ascribed to chance since the search for causal mechanisms has not 
produced anything more plausible than mere chance.” In particular, we evaluated formal models 
based on judgements of uncertainty, belief and surprise as predictors to develop a model of 
coincidentality. Ultimately, we argue that coincidentality is a marker for causal suspicion/discovery 
in terms of a flag that a new, unknown causal mechanism may be operating. 
Keywords: coincidence judgment; causal reasoning; causal discovery 
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Coincidence Judgment in Causal Reasoning: How Coincidental Is This? 
1. Introduction 
“That’s just a coincidence!” Coincidences are a common part of daily life and have attracted 
a considerable body of psychological research (e.g. Beitman, 2009; Crandall, Backstrom, Cosley, 
Suri, Huttenlocher, & Kleinberg, 2010; Diaconis & Mosteller, 1989, 2006; Falk & MacGregor, 1983; 
Falk, 1989; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007; Watt, 1991). However, a substantial part of this research 
(see the review in Johansen and Osman, 2015) connects coincidental experiences with various kinds 
of irrationality (Blackmore, 1992; Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Hanley, 1984, 1992; Matthews & 
Stones, 1989; Mock & Weisberg, 1992)  ties them to paranormal beliefs (Blackmore, 1984; Bressan, 
2002; Brugger, Regard, Landis & Grave, 1995; Glicksohn, 1990; Houran & Lange, 1996; Tobacyk, 
1995; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983) and other well-established biases, such as in probability judgments 
(Falk & MacGregor, 1983; Falk, 1989). The dominant emphasis in prior research on coincidences is 
closely aligned with the many demonstrations that human judgement and decision making are 
nonoptimal relative to objective normative standards.  
The perspective taken in the present research is an alternative that disagrees with the bias’s 
literature, not in terms of content, but rather in emphasis (though see the notable exceptions of 
Dessalles, 2008, and especially Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007). The emphasis here is on using human 
judgments about real coincidences as a way of evaluating the psychological mechanisms underlying 
causal reasoning, learning and discovery from the perspective that these mechanisms are 
substantively rational and adaptive. By combining the key family resemblance-properties in prior 
definitions of coincidence (including Coleman & Beitman, 2009; Diaconis & Mosteller, 1989; 
Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007; Henry, 1993; Mill, 1843), we proposed a new definition for the 
psychological concept of coincidence which provides the evaluative purpose of the present research: 
“coincidences are surprising pattern [co-occurrence/”co-inCIDence”] repetitions that are observed to 
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be unlikely by chance but are nonetheless ascribed to chance since the search for causal mechanisms 
has not produced anything more plausible than mere chance” (Johansen & Osman, 2015, p. 34). 
 According to this definition, coincidences are improbable and surprising, but these are not 
simply synonyms for coincidence. Coincidences tend to be improbable events, but improbable events 
aren’t necessarily coincidences (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007). For example, rolling a die six times 
and getting 464255 might be just as improbable as 666666 but not nearly as surprising (Maguire, 
Moser, Maguire & Keane, 2019) or as coincidental (Johansen & Osman, 2015). Similarly, 
coincidences are usually surprising (Falk, 1989; Falk & MacGregor, 1983; Johansen & Osman, 
2015) but events that are surprising (e.g. an unexpected firecracker or birthday party) are not 
necessarily coincidences (Johansen & Osman, 2015). So in the context of coincidences, surprise and 
improbability are in relation to co-occurrence/co-incidence patterns that capture attention and 
demand to be explained.    
Contextualized by this definition, and in contrast to the typical view of coincidences as 
indicators of biased cognition, there are two overarching mistakes/biases that can occur when 
reasoning about new causal mechanisms, caricatured as believers and skeptics (alternatively as 
“sheep” and “goats”, Bressan, 2002; Brugger, Landis & Regard, 1990; Matthews & Blackmore, 
1995). The first, believer-mistake, is to infer the existence of a causal mechanism when it does not 
actually exist. The second, skeptic-mistake, is to infer the nonexistence of a causal mechanism which 
actually does exist. Further, both perspectives are potentially biases that trade off risk in the context 
of given data: a believer runs the risk of applying inaccurate causal mechanisms, and a skeptic runs 
the risk of failing to apply a causal mechanism to situations where it does actually apply. From a 
somewhat different perspective, the danger for both is reaching a categorical conclusion, 
“coincidence!” or “cause!”, too quickly. Both tend to be biased to accept the explanation in hand 
when they should probably consider other explanations.  
The believer and skeptic biases invoke a third caricature of the curious enquirer; starting with 
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the same perception as believers and skeptics of a surprising co-occurrence/co-incidence and its 
apparent improbability by chance, the curious enquirer, because of greater consideration of possible 
mechanisms, is slower to make a coincidence versus cause attribution and does so more tentatively. 
In highlighting an alternative perspective from skeptic and believer, the emphasis here is not that 
coincidences indicate biased cognition but rather the opposite. This alternative, enquirer perspective 
exposes a way of thinking about coincidences as a part of the cognitive processing that happens 
before additional evidence that will ultimately adjudicate which causal mechanisms do and don’t 
exist. As such, we propose that coincidences are an integral, unavoidable and useful part of rational 
causal learning and reasoning (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007; Johansen & Osman, 2015), in 
particular as a flag to the curious enquirer that new causal knowledge might be available and further 
evaluation may be warranted. So coincidence judgment, especially in answer to “how coincidental is 
this?”, represents an under-evaluated psychological approach to understanding the adaptive cognitive 
mechanisms for causal reasoning.  
Despite the integral conceptual connections between coincidence and cause and the extensive 
literature on causality judgment, which asks “how causal is this?”, there has been relatively little 
evaluation of coincidence judgment, especially the question “how coincidental is this?”, and even 
less emphasizing the adaptive rather biased aspects of such judgments. More specifically, there are 
many well-formalized mathematical models of causal-learning and reasoning (Cheng, 1997; Jenkins 
& Ward, 1965; Navarro & Kemp, 2017; Pacer, 2016; Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines, 
2000; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972, Tauber Navarro, Perfors & Steyvers, 2017), but there have been 
very few formal models that have been specifically developed to predict coincidence judgment. The 
most important prior model is what we term “the Bayesian ratio model of coincidence strength”1 
(Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007). This model positions coincidences in the Bayesian conceptual 
 
1
 . This is our name rather than theirs for the “Bayesian model[s]” they argued for, but we ultimately propose a model 
that also has Bayesian probabilities and so need a terminological distinction. 
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framework as applied to causal reasoning (see also Griffiths, 2017; Tauber, Navarro, Perfors & 
Steyvers, 2017). It has several of the same key components but also some fundamental differences to 
the model we develop below, so it is important to summarize this model in detail. But the common 
emphasis of both is on coincidences as a part of the adaptive mechanisms for causal reasoning. 
1.1 Bayesian Conceptualization of Coincidences 
The Bayesian ratio model of coincidence strength is directly implied by and was developed to 
support Griffiths and Tenenbaum’s definition of coincidence as “an event that provides support for 
an alternative to a currently favored causal theory, but not necessarily enough support to accept that 
alternative in light of its low prior probability” (2007, p. 180). For example, a “thought-contact 
coincidence”, thinking of contacting someone but they contact you first, does provide genuine 
evidence for a paranormal hypothesis of a telepathic connection. Nevertheless, most people quickly 
dismiss this evidence as insufficient because prior belief summarizes so much evidence against this 
hypothesis, that is, because the prior probability for this hypothesis is extremely small. We evaluated 
this definition and our proposed definition starting in Experiment 1 with the ratio model. In 
particular, our empirical evaluation was in terms of predicting coincidentality judgments (how 
coincidental is this?) from judgments of other concepts implicated in these definitions. 
The Bayesian ratio model and the various belief and uncertainty judgments in our 
experiments are specified in relation to the general Bayesian perspective on causal hypotheses as 
formalized in relation to Bayes’ famous theorem, Equation 1. The emphasis here is not on Bayes’ 
theorem as a mathematical tool (for reversing conditional probabilities), or even as a normative 
probability standard per se but rather as psychological theory with mappings to some of the key 
components in causal reasoning: People have prior beliefs about the world before events happen, and 
they update those beliefs after experiencing those events (Lewandowsky, Griffiths and Kalish, 2009). 
Formally, the belief that a hypothesis, H, is true after the occurrence of events/data, d, maps to the 
conditional probability of the hypothesis being true given that the data has occurred, p(H|d), equation 
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1 left side. And this equates to the prior belief in the hypothesis before the events/data, as the 
probability p(H), multiplied by the current evidence as the conditional probability of the data 
occurring under the (counterfactual) assumption that the hypothesis is definitely true, p(d|H), divided 
by the overall probability of the data, p(d). So the theorem is being used as a psychological theory for 
relating beliefs, expectations and evidence as mapped to probabilities. 
Equation 1. Bayes’ theorem. pሺH|dሻ = ୮ሺୢ|Hሻ∙୮ሺHሻ୮ሺୢሻ  
Even more importantly, Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2007) proposed a construct called 
“coincidence strength” in relation to evaluating potential coincidences and formalized it as the 
support for and evidence of one causal mechanism as compared to the support and evidence for 
another. (Note that this is about the degree of belief in the existence of a causal mechanism as 
distinct from the concept of causal strength (e.g. Cheng 1997) which is about the strength of the 
connection between cause and effect not the existence of that connection per se.) In the present 
context, it is most useful to consider the alternative “causal” mechanism as chance co-occurrence in 
the absence of a connecting mechanism. This Bayesian belief updating approach (see also Gill, 2014; 
Pearl, 1982; Pearl, 2014) starts with prior relative beliefs about the hypotheses and uses the current 
evidence, the data likelihoods, to generate updated, posterior beliefs in the hypotheses. Here degree 
of belief is an estimated probability of a hypothesis being true, and data likelihood is the estimated 
probability of data co-occurrence if a given hypothesis is definitely true. Thus coincidence strength is 
the relative extent to which one mechanism is supported over the other after the co-incidence has 
occurred. 
Across multiple psychological judgment experiments using manipulated coincidences 
together with many computationally derived probabilities, Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2007) showed 
that coincidence strength is related to the relative posterior hypothesis support as a ratio. It is also 
related to the data likelihood ratio, the probability of the data in the context of the two hypotheses, 
detailed below. 
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Because the results from our experiments will show that coincidence strength is an important 
predictor of judged coincidentality, we describe Griffiths and Tenenbaum’s (2007) ratio model of 
coincidence strength, Equation 2, in detail. Coincidence strength is proportional to the relative 
support, log odds form of Bayes’ Theorem in relation to the evaluation of and belief in causal and 
chance hypotheses. The emphasis in Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2007) was on evaluating two specific 
hypotheses, but the emphasis here is on contrasting causal and chance hypotheses overall. In detail, 
Equation 2 says that the judged coincidence strength, Cs, of a co-incidence is related to the relative 
extent of the posterior belief in and support for the causal hypothesis, p(Ca|d), versus for the chance 
hypothesis, p(Ch|d), expressed as the logarithm of their ratio, log [୮ሺCa|ୢሻ୮ሺC୦|ୢሻ]. The probabilities in this 
odds ratio form both derive directly from Bayes’ theorem, Equation 1, and the log odds form has the 
important property of making the posterior log odds the sum of the log data likelihood odds plus the 
prior belief odds. This leads to an extremely useful Bayes’ space conceptualization of coincidence 
strength, Figure 1 (and see Figure 2 in Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007). 
Equation 2: Cs~log [୮ሺCa|ୢሻ୮ሺC୦|ୢሻ] = log [୮ሺୢ|Caሻ୮ሺୢ|C୦ሻ] + log [୮ሺCaሻ୮ሺC୦ሻ]  
Coincidence strength has a clear interpretation in Bayes’ space as shown in Figure 1, where 
the y-axis is the relative prior beliefs in the causal and chance hypotheses as the log of the ratio of 
their respective probabilities, and the x-axis is the relative likelihoods of the coincidence via the 
causal and chance hypotheses as the log ratio of these probabilities. Then each point in the space, as 
a combination of an x-axis co-ordinate and a y-axis co-ordinate, corresponds to a coincidence 
strength as per Equation 2. Events toward the bottom left hand of the space are “just coincidence”. 
They correspond to a priors ratio (on the y-axis) favoring the chance hypothesis over the causal 
hypothesis; p(Ch) > p(Ca), the ratio p(Ca) / p(Ch) is a small number less than 1, and so the log of 
p(Ca)/p(Ch) is negative. Further, the log likelihoods ratio on the x-axis only slightly favors the data 
as occurring due to the causal hypothesis over the chance; p(d|Ca) is only slightly larger than 
9 
 
p(d|Ch), p(d|Ca) / p(d|Ch) is only slightly larger than 1, so log p(d|Ca)/p(d|Ch) is only moderately 
positive. Thus the only slightly positive log likelihoods ratio isn’t sufficient to overcome the 
substantially negative log priors ratio, resulting in relatively low coincidence strength. Coincidence 
strength, then, increases diagonally from the bottom left to the top right of the space; going from the 
region of “just coincidence” to “suspicious coincidence” (separated by a small dotted line) 
corresponds to the positive log likelihoods ratio doing a better job of overcoming the negative log 
priors ratio, and a better job still for “evidence” region (to use Griffiths and Tenenbaum’s 
terminology). The dashed line through the origin from the top left to the bottom right of the space 
corresponds to a posteriors ratio of one, that is equal belief in the causal and chance hypotheses, and 
the increase in coincidence strength, from just coincidence to suspicious coincidence to evidence, 
occurs orthogonal to this negative diagonal. 
As a concrete example, consider the simple thought-contact coincidence mentioned earlier, in 
relation to the Bayes’ space in Figure 1: Prior belief in the causal hypothesis that just thinking of 
someone will cause (via telepathic communication) them to get in touch is low (for most people) and 
correspondingly prior belief in the chance hypothesis that such co-incidences are just due to chance 
is high (it just so happens that you thought of them at the same time they thought of you). Thus the 
prior relative belief ratio for the causal to chance hypothesis is a number substantially less than 1, 
pሺCaሻpሺChሻ, because belief in the causal hypothesis is substantially less than the chance hypothesis. The 
natural log of this priors ratio is then a negative number corresponding to a value on the y-axis 
toward the bottom in the figure. Now consider the data likelihoods of the thought-contact event given 
the causal and chance hypothesis respectively. These are hypothetical conditional probabilities; 
under the counterfactual assumption that the (paranormal) causal hypothesis is true, what is the 
probability that the thought-contact event occurs? The implication is that p(d|Ca) is a relatively 
large probability. (Note, though, that this probability need not be that near 1 just as a causal 
mechanism definitely existing doesn’t necessarily mean that the cause always produces the effect.) 
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Figure 1. Coincidence strength, the posteriors belief ratio for the causal and chance hypotheses, in 
Bayes’ space. The x-axis is the log of the data likelihoods ratio for the causal and chance hypotheses 
respectively. The y-axis is the log of the priors ratio of beliefs in the causal and chance hypotheses 
respectively. The blue arrow indicates increasing coincidence strength. See main text for details. 
Figure adapted partly from Figure 2 in Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2007). 
 
Correspondingly, the probability of the thought-contact event if the chance hypothesis is true can’t 
be all that high, especially for example if the friend was from childhood and not heard from in 
twenty years. So p(d|Ch) is implied to be a relatively small probability. Thus the data likelihoods odds 
ratio, pሺd|Caሻpሺd|Chሻ , is a number substantially bigger than 1 because the data are a lot more likely via the 
causal hypothesis than the chance hypothesis. The natural log of likelihoods ratio is then a positive 
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number corresponding to a value on the x-axis toward the right in the figure. The combination of the 
small log priors ratio toward the bottom of the y-axis, log pሺCaሻpሺChሻ, with the large log likelihoods ratio 
to the right on the x-axis with the likelihoods ratio, pሺd|Caሻpሺd|Chሻ , puts coincidences in general 
predominantly in the bottom right quadrant of the space and with an intermediate posteriors ratio 
near 1 corresponding to a log posteriors ratio near 0, log pሺCa|dሻpሺCh|dሻ = log pሺd|Caሻpሺd|Chሻ + log pሺCaሻpሺChሻ .  This 
fits neatly with Griffiths and Tenenbaum’s (2007) definition of coincidences as events which provide 
some support for an alternative, e.g. paranormal, hypothesis over some other hypothesis such as 
chance but not enough to overcome prior beliefs against the alternative hypothesis. And the larger 
the log posterior ratio, the greater the evidence for the causal mechanism and thus the greater 
coincidence strength. So again coincidence strength as relative evidence for the causal hypothesis 
over the chance increases diagonally from the bottom left to the top right of the space, Figure 1. As 
subsequent results from our experiments will show, this space provides a partial, but incomplete 
account of coincidentality, in response to the question “how coincidental is this?” We will argue 
causality and coincidentality are not equivalent constructs but rather correspond to different things.   
 Before giving an overview of our research, a real example of an actual coincidence, the solar 
eclipse coincidence, is useful to contextualize the key purposes of this research and preview a key 
conclusion: The remarkably close co-incidence of the apparent size of the moon and sun during 
certain kinds of solar eclipse in the only place in the universe where we know there is life has been 
widely noted; had either been slightly bigger/smaller, slightly closer/farther, etc., eclipse alignment 
wouldn’t be nearly as good or as surprising as it is. A common believer perspective, especially for 
advocates of various religions, is to argue that the co-incidence is too unlikely by chance (d|Ch is 
judged small) to actually be chance (Ch|d is believed small), and the lack of a standard causal 
mechanism linking good eclipses and life (Ca|d and d|Ca are small) means that a deity must have 
caused both. In reaction, a common skeptic perspective is to admit this co-incidence is fairly unlikely 
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by chance (d|Ch), but then argue as follows: the lack of a clear causal mechanism (Ca|d and d|Ca are 
small) implies this is just a chance event, i.e. a coincidence (Ch|d is relatively large because of the 
large prior belief in chance, p(Ch)). They also tend to point to the many attributes the earth has as 
providing many possible places surprising coincidences might have occurred thus increasing the 
probability of such co-incidences in at least some of these just by chance, i.e. p(Ch|d) is large even 
though d|Ch for the specific co-incidence is small.  In contrast to both of these approaches to 
interpreting this co-incidence, the emphasis here is on the curious enquirer who, like the others, notes 
the surprising improbability of the co-incidence by chance (small d|Ch) as well as by well-
established causal mechanisms (small d|Ca). However unlike the skeptics and believers, the curious 
enquirer is extremely suspicious that there might be an as yet unclear causal mechanism operating, 
but they are also actively looking for and wanting a lot more evidence, as there is currently only one 
place known to have life, the earth. And it is worth emphasizing that, in contrast to research 
comparing human/psychological judgment against a normative standard, the true/normative values 
for the key judged probabilities do not tend to be objectively known for real co-incidence situations 
involving causal suspicion. The objective truth isn’t yet clear. As such, while co-incidences occur 
objectively in the world, coincidences are perceptions associated with beliefs and judgments and so 
are psychological phenomena in peoples’ minds. 
1.2 Research Purpose and Overview 
The data-driven purpose of this research was to evaluate the basic psychological judgment 
properties of coincidences using a reasonably large sample of real, naturally occurring coincidences 
from a diary study. The rationale for this, in contrast to most prior judgment studies on coincidences, 
was to avoid using artificially fabricated or manipulated coincidences so as to evaluate the judgment 
processes involved with the conceptual richness of real events, as self-judged coincidences by the 
participants that had experienced them (Diary study). And the central judgment we asked all of our 
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participants to provide, in contrast to the large prior literature on causality, was coincidentality as the 
answer to the basic question, “how coincidental is this?” 
The theory-driven purpose of our empirical work was to support our psychological definition 
by developing a model of coincidentality based on psychological judgments for concepts implicated 
by the definition. But it is worth highlighting that we did not give participants this or any other 
definition of coincidence. Four experiments progressively evaluated the conceptual components in 
our definition of coincidence and their relations to judged coincidentality:  Experiment 1 measured 
degree belief in the truth of causal and chance hypotheses as related to the part of the definition 
“coincidences are…. ascribed to chance [p(Ch|d) is high]… search… has not produced anything 
more plausible than mere chance [p(Ca|d) is low]”.  Experiment 2 assessed event likelihood 
(probability) in the context of causal and chance hypotheses as related to the part of the definition, 
“coincidences are … unlikely by chance [d|Ch is low]”. Experiment 3 elicited judgments of event 
surprisingness, “coincidences are surprising…”, and evaluated several ways of formalizing surprise 
based on event likelihood judgments. Finally, Experiment 4 evaluates all key judgments in a within 
participants design so as to assess the relations between all the key components of the definition.2. 
Ultimately, the purpose was to support the psychological construct of coincidentality as a cognitive 
marker that new causal mechanisms might be operating and further evaluation may lead to new, 
adaptive causal knowledge. 
2. Materials Diary Study 
This study collected a sample of naturally occurring self-reported coincidences. These were 
used as materials for subsequent judgment experiments. 
 
2
 These experiments also had other judgment and/or trait tasks, usually small and at the end, the results of which 
we do not report in the interests of space and focus These included a variety of clinical and personality measures and 
small judgment tasks such as judgments about contrived coincidences with known probabilities. Methodologically, the 
core judgment tasks were unlikely to have been substantively influenced by these other tasks as they were mostly 
completed after the core judgment tasks. 
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2.1 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-five students from University of Surrey and University College London completed 
this experiment in exchange for partial course credit or an option to enter a £50 lottery draw. 
2.2.2 Procedure 
Each participant was asked to record any coincidences they experienced in a booklet “in as 
much detail as possible.” The diary covered a five-week period. 
2.2 Results and Discussion 
Participants recorded 102 coincidences, examples in Table 1. Five of these were eliminated 
(as potentially offensive), and the set of 97 coincidences used in subsequent experiments was edited 
only slightly to fix typographical errors/spelling mistakes.  A key aspect of these results is that, 
unlike most prior research, the participants were actively watching for coincidences rather than 
retrospectively reporting them (Bressan, 2002). 
3. Experiment 1. Coincidentality and the Likeliness of Causal/Chance Hypotheses Given the Data 
This experiment evaluated three key judgments—coincidentality, causal likeliness and 
chance likeliness--for the diary set of coincidences. These judgments were answers to the questions, 
How coincidental is this?, How likely due to chance? and How likely due to causal mechanism?, all 
Table 1. Example coincidences from the diary study 
Blond-guy coincidence 
(typically judged most 
coincidental in the set and 
marked by red circles in 
subsequent figures.) 
“In January I was in NZ. I was in a Belgian restaurant with my 
parents when we noticed an English family, particularly a blond 
guy that was my age drinking next to a bus. When I moved to 
Guildford I met the same guy again because we were going to 
the same gym.” 
 
Weekend-alarm coincidence 
(typically judged least 
coincidental, blue squares.) 
 
“At the week-end I woke up at almost exactly the same time my 
alarm goes off on a weekday.” 
 
Thought-contact coincidence 
 
“Having been discussing the unlikelihood of bumping into a 
certain person that I have not seen for ages around campus, I 
bumped into them on several occasions later that day.”  
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on 1 to 100 judgment scales. Having both causal and chance likeliness judgments as estimates of 
belief in the posterior hypotheses for cause and chance respectively allowed direct assessment of the 
Bayesian ratio model, Equation 2. 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-three undergraduate psychology students at Cardiff University completed this 
experiment in exchange for course credit as part of a participant panel. 
3.1.2 Materials, Design and Procedure 
In overview, judgment tasks were presented as a series of worksheets in Microsoft Excel with 
instructions to work through the sheets in order. The instructions for each task were in the top left 
cell of each worksheet, and the order of the coincidences on each sheet was randomized.  
Participants completed three separate judgment tasks on the 97 diary study coincidences: 1) 
coincidentality, 2) causal likeliness and 3) chance likeliness--in counterbalanced order. The 
coincidentality rating task was to answer the question, “how coincidental is this?” for each of the 97 
coincidences on a scale from 1, not at all coincidental, to 100, extremely coincidental. The causal 
likeliness instructions were, “On a scale from 1 to 100 please specify how likely the events in each 
description are to have been causally connected where 1 is not at all likely to have been causally 
connected and 100 is extremely likely to have been causally connected.” The chance likeliness task 
instructions were, “On a scale from 1 to 100, please specify how likely the events in each description 
are to have occurred by chance where 1 is not at all likely to have occurred by chance and 100 is 
extremely likely to have occurred by chance.”  
3.1.3 Data tabulation and modeling analysis 
The handling of missing, ambiguous and repetitive responses as well as judgment scale 
reversals by a minority of participants for this and subsequent experiments is described in detail in 
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Appendix A. But to summarize: Averaged data in figures and modeling results was based on all data 
except that a small number of individual responses that were substantially outside of the judgment 
scales (1 to 100), e.g. 606, were deleted. However, combined plots of individual participant 
responses, e.g. Figure 2 bottom panels, only included participants with no scale reversals, as did 
individual participant model fits. It is worth noting that prior research, including Griffiths and 
Tenenbaum (2007), has also eliminated scale-reversed participants. However, such scale reversals 
were relatively rare here, e.g. only four participants out of 33 apparently reversed the coincidentality 
scale in this experiment. Also we report correlation, r, for judgment relations and R2 for model fits. 
3.2 Results and Discussion 
Coincidentality was negatively related to causal likeliness for both data averaged across 
participants by coincidence, r = -0.75, and all (nonreversed) individual participant judgements 
combined together, r = - 0.37. Coincidentality was positively related to chance likeliness for both 
averaged data, r = + 0.90, and combined (nonreversed) data, r = +0.58. Further, since causal and 
chance hypotheses are mutually exclusive, increased support for one conceptually corresponds to 
decreased support for the other, consistent with the observed negative relationship between causal 
and chance likeliness rates for averaged data, r = -0.77, and combined (nonreversed) data, r = -0.44. 
Thus, the causal and chance likeliness judgments are consistent with these being measures of support 
for and degree of belief in the Bayesian posterior hypotheses for cause and chance. 
Combining the causal and chance likeliness judgments together in a posteriors hypothesis 
belief ratio, Equation 2, coincidentality was inversely related to this ratio, Figure 2; it accounted for 
70% of the variance in coincidentality for averaged data, R2 = 0.70 top panel, for 25% of the variance 
of the combined (nonreversed) results, R2 = 0.25 in the bottom panels, and an average of 26% of the 
variance for individual (nonreversed) participants (R2 = 0.26, model details in Appendix B).  
Posterior ratios greater than 1 correspond to a balance of support favoring causal mechanisms over 
chance, so for example the ‘weekend-alarm’ coincidence (Table 1) had an averaged posteriors ratio 
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of slightly less than 3 (the blue square Figure 2 top panel), supporting the causal over the chance 
hypothesis. Posteriors ratios less than 1 correspond to a balance of evidence favoring chance over 
causal mechanisms, so for example the ‘blond-guy’ coincidence had a posterior ratio of less than 0.5 
thus supporting the chance hypothesis (the red circle Figure 2 top panel). Since these events were 
reported coincidences, the majority had posterior ratios less than 1. 
The results in Figure 2 show that judged coincidentality is inversely related to the posteriors 
ratio and thus inversely related to the construct of coincidence strength, equation 1. Further the trend 
line in the figure suggests this relationship is logarithmic. So the first form of the coincidentality 
model, Equation 3, is that coincidentality is related to the log of the inverted posteriors belief ratio. 
And to account for individual differences in scale use, the model has two scaling parameters; 
Co_scale, to accommodate participants who restricting their responding to a subsection of a 
judgment scale, and a centrality parameter, Co_mid, to account for participants whose sets of 
coincidentality judgments were not centered on the middle of judgment scale. 
Equation 3. C∅~C୭_sୡa୪ୣ ∙ logୣ [ 1Cs] +C୭ౣiౚ , Cs ≈ ୮ሺ��|�ሻ୮ሺ��|�ሻ = 1−୮ሺ��|�ሻ୮ሺ��|�ሻ  
Taken together, these results indicate the stability of coincidentality (how coincidental is 
this?) as a psychological construction. In particular, this stability is indicated by coherence with other 
judgments, e.g. the predictiveness of coincidence strength.  These results support the component of 
our definition of coincidences as events which are “ascribed to chance [p(Ch|d) is high] since the 
search for causal mechanisms has not produced anything [p(Ca|d) is low] more plausible than chance 
[the inverted posterior ratio p(Ch|d)/p(Ca|d) is large].” However, what is apparently missing is 
support for that aspect of our definition of coincidence as “unlikely by chance....” This is implied in 
the combined (nonreversed) judgment results for coincidentality versus coincidence strength in the 
bottom panels of Figure 2: when belief in the causal hypothesis posterior is large relative to the 
chance posterior, coincidentality is constrained to be low, consistent with things that are definitely 
causally connected not being coincidences; but when the causal posterior is low, coincidentality is 
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not correspondingly constrained and can be high or low. Both the proposed definition of coincidence 
and the data in the bottom panel of Figure 2 suggest that another factor contributes to coincidentality 
when the causal posterior is not large (relative to the chance posterior). And the representation of 
coincidence strength, Equation 2, in Bayes’ space, Figure 1, makes plausible suggestions for what  
Figure 2. Average coincidentality versus the ratio of the average causal likeliness (Ca|d) to the 
average chance likeliness (Ch|d), top panel, and combined plots of all nonreversed participants’ 
judgments, bottom panels, from Experiment 1. Error bars are standard error. Note that the left bottom 
panel is a magnification of the right bottom panel for posterior ratios between 0 and 5. The trend line 
is logarithmic. Red circles are the blond-guy coincidence and blue squares are the weekend-alarm 
coincidence from Table 1. A small amount of noise jitter has been added to the data points in this and 
subsequent combined data panels to more clearly convey data density.   
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this might be in terms of the data likelihoods; the likelihood of the co-incidence under the 
 (counterfactual) assumption that the causal hypothesis is definitely true, p(d|Ca), and the likelihood 
of the coincidence given that the chance hypothesis is definitely true, p(d|Ch). As described in the 
Introduction, it is conceptually important to distinguish data likelihoods given the hypotheses, 
p(d|Ca) and p(d|Ch), from the posterior probabilities of the hypotheses given the data, p(Ca|d) and 
p(Ch|d). This was examined in Experiment 2.  
4. Experiment 2. Coincidentality and Data Likelihood Given the Causal and Chance Hypotheses 
The primary purpose of this experiment was to add judgments of data likelihood for the 
causal and chance hypotheses. Experiment 1’s likeliness judgments were about posteriors hypotheses 
beliefs, e.g. a preference for the chance hypothesis over the causal hypothesis such as for a thought-
contact coincidence that does not produce posterior belief in a paranormal causal hypothesis about 
telepathic connection. But even if posterior belief/likeliness is low, data likelihoods for paranormal 
causal hypotheses can be high for coincidences, e.g. if telepathic connections are assumed to 
definitely exist, the probability of such coincidences might be genuinely high. To emphasize, both 
Bayes’ theorem (Equation 1) and coincidence strength (Equation 2) suggest that likelinesses and 
likelihoods are different concepts. A key motivation for these judgments is to address the distinction 
in our definition of coincidence “unlikely by chance, but nonetheless ascribed to chance....” And a 
related benefit is that these measures then allow coincidentality to be evaluated in relation to the 
conceptually powerful Bayes’ space (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007) in Figure 1, and to Griffiths and 
Tenenbaum’s definition of coincidence as events where there is a contrast between prior beliefs and 
present evidence. 
4.1 Methods 
4.1.1 Participants 
The forty participants were from a psychology participant panel at Cardiff University, 17 as 
part of a paid panel and 23 in exchange for partial course credit. 
20 
 
4.1.2 Materials, Design and Procedure 
As with Experiment 1, Experiment 2 measured coincidentality, causal likeliness as a measure 
of posterior belief in the causal hypothesis and chance likeliness as posterior belief in the chance 
hypothesis separately on all 97 diary study coincidences. In addition, causal data likelihood and 
chance likelihood were also separately assessed on the full set. Thus Experiment 2 contained 
judgments of both posterior hypothesis probabilities and both coincidence likelihoods given those 
hypotheses. Causal likelihood, as the probability of the data given the causal hypothesis (d|Ca), was 
measured using the following (counterfactual) instructions: “Assume you know for sure that the 
events in each description are the result of a causal mechanism connecting them. However keep in 
mind that some causally connected events are less or more likely to occur than others. On a scale 
from 1 to 100, please specify how likely the events in each description are to have occurred where 1 
is not at all likely and 100 is extremely likely to have occurred.” Similarly, chance likelihood as the 
probability of the data given the chance hypothesis (d|Ch) was assessed using similar instructions 
starting, “Assume you know for sure that the events in each description occurred solely as a result of 
chance. However keep in mind that some chance events are less or more likely to occur than others. 
On a scale from 1 to 100. . . .” As in previous experiments, the coincidences were in different 
random orders for each task and participant. 
All participants completed the coincidentality rating task. However, to keep the experiment to 
a reasonable length, only half of the participants completed each probability rating task; that is, half 
of the participations did the causal posterior task (Ca|d) and the chance likelihood task (d|Ch) while 
the other half of the participants did the chance posterior task (Ch|d) and the causal likelihood task 
(d|Ca). Thus, each participant did three separate ratings tasks on the full diary set. The first two tasks 
were coincidentality and a posterior ratings task (either Ca|d or Ch|d) with order counterbalanced 
across participants. The third rating task was always a likelihood rating task, either causal (d|Ca) or 
chance likelihood (d|Ch). 
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4.2 Results and Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 for coincidentality and the posteriors judgments again 
indicating the stability of these constructs; there was a negative relationship between coincidentality 
and the causal posterior for averaged data, r = -0.76 shown in Figure 3’s top left panel, and a positive 
relationship between coincidentality and the chance posterior, r = 0.53, top right panel. The key 
additional results were that coincidentality was negatively related to average causal likelihood, r =    
-0.85 shown in Figure 3’s bottom left panel, and, critically, that coincidentality was negatively 
related to chance likelihood, r = -0.85, bottom right panel. 
Taken together, the difference in the relationships between coincidentality and, respectively, 
the chance posteriors (Figure 3 top right panel) and the chance likelihoods (bottom right panel) 
supports our definition of coincidence as “unlikely by chance but… ascribed to chance…”, i.e. 
coincidences are “unlikely by chance” in terms of a relatively small chance likelihood, p(d|Ch), “but 
nonetheless ascribed to chance” in terms of a relatively large chance posterior, p(Ch|d), because “the 
search for causal mechanisms has not produced anything”, the causal posterior being small, “more 
plausible than mere chance”, relative to the chance posterior.  
Having judgments of both posterior hypothesis probabilities and both coincidence likelihoods 
means that all three of the key Bayesian ratios can be specified (equation 2): the posteriors ratio of 
the causal to chance hypotheses, p(Ca|d)/p(Ch|d); the likelihoods ratio for the coincidence given the 
cause and chance hypothesis, p(d|Ca)/p(d|Ch) and the priors ratio for the causal and chance 
hypotheses, p(Ca)/p(Ch), which can be inferred via Bayes’ theorem (as the posteriors ratio divided 
by the likelihoods ratio). Having all three ratios allows coincidentality to be represented in the 
conceptual Bayes’ space (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2007) described in the Introduction (Figure 1) 
and shown for the present data in the central panel of Figure 4. In Figure 4 coincidentality is color 
coded in relation to the two key extreme coincidences (Table 1), the ‘blond-guy’ coincidence (the 
large red circle), and the ‘weekend-alarm’ coincidence (the large blue square). The top panel 
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explicitly shows this color coding with coincidentality, y-axis, versus the log of the coincidence 
likelihoods ratio, x-axis, and the far right panel shows coincidentality, x-axis, versus the log of the 
priors ratio, y-axis. The bottom left panel then shows color-coded coincidentality in Bayes’ space 
with the log priors ratio on the x-axis, aligned with the x-axis in the top panel, and the log likelihoods 
ratio on the y-axis, aligned with the y-axis in the far right panel. This representation supports  
Figure 3. Coincidentality versus each of the four probability judgments--the causal and chance 
posteriors and the causal and chance likelihoods--for averaged judgments from Experiment 2. Error 
bars are standard error. Trendlines are linear with percentage of variance accounted for. Red circles 
are the blond-guy coincidence and blue squares are the weekend-alarm coincidence from Table 1. 
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Griffiths and Tenenbaum’s (2007) claim and definition that coincidences tend to be events where the 
 likelihood ratio is positive, that is, data points to the right of zero on the x-axis favoring the data as 
the result of a causal hypothesis, but the priors ratio is negative, data points below zero on the y-axis 
favoring the chance hypothesis; thus most of the coincidences are in the bottom right hand quadrant,  
Figure 4. Average coincidentality color coded in Bayes’ space (Figure 1) composed of the log of the 
priors ratios of the averages, y-axis, and the log of the likelihoods ratios of the averages, the x-axis of 
the central panel, for data from Experiment 2. The top panel shows the color coding of 
coincidentality, y-axis, in relation to the log likelihoods ratio, the x-axis, red is most coincidental and 
blue is least. And the right panel shows a similar coding of coincidentality for the priors ratio. Large 
Red circles are the blond-guy coincidence, and large blue squares are the weekend-alarm coincidence 
from Table 1. 
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with only a handful of probably causal events in the top right hand quadrant, notably the weekend-
alarm coincidence (Table 1) as the most causal of the events. 
An important aspect of representing coincidentality in Bayes’ space (Figure 4) is that 
coincidentality seems to increase roughly along a negative diagonal from the top left, the weekend- 
alarm coincidence, to the bottom right, the blond-guy coincidence. A particular benefit of Bayes’ 
space is that it corresponds to a specific formalization for the concept that is explicitly missing from 
the posteriors ratio as related to coincidentality, namely surprise. Surprise features prominently in 
our definition of coincidence in terms of “surprising pattern repetitions,” and intuitively/anecdotally 
surprise is a very common property of coincidences. This Bayesian surprise, shown in an updated 
version of Bayes’ space in Figure 5, was described by Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2007, and relatedly 
by Baldi & Itti, 2010) as the extent of the conflict/disagreement between expectations (prior beliefs) 
and current events (data likelihoods). In detail, this conflict is between the likelihoods ratio and 
priors ratio in terms of the priors ratio favoring the chance hypothesis but the likelihoods ratio 
favoring the data as from the causal hypothesis. Thus, Bayesian surprise increases toward the bottom 
right hand of the space since points progressively farther toward the bottom right correspond to 
progressively more positive log likelihoods ratios on the x-axis (favoring the data as from the causal 
hypothesis) but progressively more negative values of the priors ratio on the y-axis (favoring the 
chance hypothesis). So the larger the likelihoods ratio and the smaller the priors ratio the greater 
Bayesian surprise. This suggests Bayesian surprise is based on a ratio of these two ratios, Equation 4 
right hand side, that is, the likelihoods ratio divided by the priors ratio; the larger the likelihood ratio 
in the numerator and the smaller the priors ratio in the denominator, the bigger the ratio of ratios and 
the higher Bayesian surprise. Conceptually, the reason the posteriors ratio, Equation 2, isn't a 
measure of Bayesian surprise is that a posteriors ratio of one can arise because the likelihoods and 
priors ratios are both 1 or because the priors ratio is very small and the likelihoods ratio is very large. 
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Thus, coincidence strength by itself doesn’t indicate surprise, but the extent of the conflict between 
prior beliefs and present events does, Equation 4. 
To facilitate evaluation of Bayesian surprise, the bottom left panel of Figure 6 presents an 
updated Bayes’ space where the x-axis is Bayesian surprise, the log ratio of the likelihoods ratio to 
the priors ratio, i.e. a ratio of ratios, and the y-axis is then the log of the posteriors ratio. This is not a 
new space but is rather a rotation of the original space, in Figure 4, by 45 degrees counter-clockwise. 
But now the additional smaller panels associated with each axis in the main panel on the bottom left  
Figure 5. Bayesian surprise as the extent of the disagreement between the prior belief and data 
likelihoods ratios the y and x axes respectively in the Bayes’ space from Figure 1 in the Introduction. 
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show color-coded coincidentality in relation to Bayesian surprise (top panel) and to the posterior 
ratio (right panel). Bayesian surprise accounted for R2 = 0.49 of the variance in coincidentality for 
averaged data (Figure 6 top panel), coincidence strength for R2 = 0.53 (right panel) and the 
combination of both for R2 = 0.55 (Appendix B). This updated model is in Equation 4.  
Equation 4. C∅~C୭_sୡa୪ୣ ∙ logୣ [Su ∙ 1Cs] +C୭_୫୧ୢ, Cs ≈ ୮ሺ��|�ሻ୮ሺ��|�ሻ , ��~Bs ≈ (�ሺ�|��ሻ�(�|��))(pሺ��ሻp(��))  
Figure 6. Average coincidentality from Experiment 2 color coded in rotated Bayes’ space, with the 
log of Bayesian surprise on the x-axis and log coincidence strength on the y-axis of the central panel. 
The color coding of coincidentality, blue for low coincidentality and red for high, is shown in 
relation to log Bayesian surprise on the x-axis in the top panel and in relation to the log posteriors 
ratio on the y-axis in the right panel. Large Red circles are the blond-guy coincidence, and large blue 
squares are the weekend-alarm coincidence from Table 1. 
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In summary, Experiment 2 replicated and extended the prior experiment in terms of predicting 
coincidentality. The results support the contrast between the chance likelihood and the chance  
posterior in the definition of coincidence in terms of “unlikely by chance but nonetheless  
ascribed to chance”. Furthermore, these results replicate the (negative) relationship between 
coincidentality and coincidence strength and show that Bayesian surprise is also a good predictor of  
coincidentality. The conceptual and empirical importance of surprise for coincidences strongly 
suggested measuring judgments of surprise, Experiment 3. 
5. Experiment 3. Coincidentality and Surprise 
While not a synonym for coincidence (e.g. a sudden loud bang need not be a coincidence), 
surprise is a very typical attribute of coincidences anecdotally, in prior definitions including ours 
(e.g. Henry, 1993; Johansen & Osman, 2015) and in prior coincidence research (e.g. Falk & 
MacGregor, 1983). Surprise is an emotion associated with unexpected events and responding to such 
events with heightened awareness (expressed as widened eyes, etc.) and vigilance (Izard, 1991). And 
surprise, in terms of an unexpected event, is implicated as a basic part of associative learning in 
terms of prediction error e.g. as formalized in the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 
1972). Relatedly, surprise can act as an attractor/driver for attention (e.g. Baldi & Itti, 2005). Foster 
and Keane (2015; 2019) propose a metacognitive explanation-based theory of surprise where 
surprise is inversely related to the availability of plausible explanations, similar to the argument we 
make for coincidences in terms of the initial lack of mechanisms that are plausible. From their 
perspective, surprise as a continuous construct is a metacognitive marker anticipating the amount of 
effort it will take to find the right explanation and eliminate the surprise. Our view in the context of 
coincidences is more constrained in that surprise is the lack of plausible explanations as related to the 
improbability of the mechanisms in hand; sometimes coincidences that initially are very surprising 
on reflection resolve with a sudden, low effort realization of a plausible explanation. Foster and 
Keane (2015) also argue against a probability-based theory of surprise. Computational complexity 
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theory provides a related perspective (Schmidhuber, 2009) on psychological surprise as a 
metacognitive anticipation of the potential for data compressibility; in the context of the goal to 
accurately keep a record of events in reality, truly random events tend to require very long 
descriptions corresponding to data that are relatively uncompressible. In contrast, events with a good 
theoretical account are well summarized by that account, and hence the data are highly compressible 
in terms of only needing to store the account rather than all the different data points. From this 
perspective, surprise anticipates the potential for such a good account before the mechanisms 
underlying that compressibility have been fully worked out. So surprise can be seen as occurring for 
an intermediate state between completely random (uncompressible) and completely predictable (very 
compressible) data (Schmidhuber, 2009). While coincidences tend to be fairly unique events with 
relatively little immediate compressibility because the data are so limited, they do imply the potential 
for such compressibility in the future in terms of an unknown mechanism. And this is related to the 
concept of a “randomness deficiency” in data (Li & Vitányi, 2019) in terms of apparent patterns in 
the data which don’t obviously correspond to plausible known mechanisms. And the idea of 
randomness deficiency eliciting surprise (Maguire, et al. 2019) as a contrast between an apparent 
pattern and chance resonates strongly with our definition of coincidence (Johansen & Osman, 2015). 
Finally, the pervasive idea of surprise as a contrast between expectations and events arises naturally 
in the Bayesian framework. We’ve formalized this to align with Bayes’ space in Figure 5 (Griffiths 
& Tenenbaum, 2007) but related accounts have been in terms of the difference between the 
distributions of the posteriors and priors (Baldi & Itti, 2010). Overall these different perspectives on 
surprise all implicate its importance for adaptive behavior in the face of uncertain events. As such, 
co-occurrence surprise is an important property of coincidences.    
The purpose of this experiment was to evaluate judged surprise and its relationships with 
coincidentality and the various uncertainty judgements, which were used to specify several derived 
measures of surprise including Bayesian surprise. In addition, coincidences sometimes acquire 
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importance in terms of fortune, luck or fate in the context of various paranormal beliefs because of 
the personal benefit or harm attached to them (Beitman, 2009; Henry, 1993). More generally 
outcome valence in terms of benefit and harm has a pervasive role in causal reasoning (e.g. Shultz, 
1982; Shultz, Fisher, Pratt & Rulf, 1986; Fugelsang & Thompson, 2000). Experiment 3 also 
evaluated judged valence, that is how good or bad each coincidence was for the person who 
experienced it. 
5.1 Methods 
5.1.1 Participants 
Fifty participants completed this experiment in exchange for partial course credit as part of a 
psychology participant panel at Cardiff University. 
5.1.2 Materials, Design and Procedure 
As with Experiment 2, Experiment 3 included judgments for coincidentality, the causal and 
chance hypothesis posteriors, and the causal and chance likelihoods. In addition, Experiment 3 
included a rating of surprise, “Please specify how surprising the events in each description are where 
1 is not at all surprising and 100 is extremely surprising.” Also, there was a valence rating task, “On 
a scale from -100 to +100, please specify how bad or good the person who experienced the events in 
each description found them where -100 is extremely bad, 0 is neutral and +100 is extremely good.” 
All participants in Experiment 3 completed four separate judgment tasks on the diary set of 
97 coincidences. In particular, all participants did the coincidentality rating task and a separate 
surprise and valence task which asked for both surprise and valence ratings for each coincidence. 
Half of the participants did the two posteriors judgments as two separate tasks while the other half of 
the participants did the two likelihoods judgments as separate tasks. Task order was counterbalanced. 
5.2 Results and Discussion 
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Experiment 3 replicated the key relationships between coincidentality, the two posteriors 
hypothesis judgments and the two coincidence likelihoods judgments; consistent with Experiment 
2’s results, Figure 3, average coincidentality here was negatively related to the causal posterior, r = -
0.62, positively related to the chance posterior, r = 0.68, negatively related to the causal likelihood, r 
= -0.76, and negatively related to the chance likelihood, r = -0.69. More importantly, coincidentality 
was positively related to judged surprise, r = 0.90 for averaged data and r = 0.52 for combined 
(nonreversed) data. However, coincidentality and judged valence had no apparent relationship, r = 
0.04 for averaged data. While the valence results are somewhat puzzling, a plausible reason for the 
lack of any apparent relationship is that the valence judgments were for someone else’s rather than 
personally experienced events. Since they are not predictive of coincidentality here and not explicitly 
in our definition of coincidence, we don’t consider them further. 
Having measures of surprise and coincidence strength means that color-coded coincidentality 
can be represented in an analogue of the rotated Bayes’ space from Experiment 2’s Figure 6 as 
shown here in Figure 7. Notably, coincidentality increases toward the bottom right where surprise is 
high and the log of the posteriors belief ratio is negative, favoring the chance hypothesis. The 
combination of surprise and coincidence strength predicted coincidentality reasonably well, R2 = 
0.84 for averaged data and an average of R2 = 0.19 for individual participants (model details in 
Appendix B). In this context, surprise by itself was a better predictor of coincidentality (R2 = 0.80) 
than coincidence strength (R2 = 0.48) for averaged data and for individual (nonreversed) participants, 
average R2 = 0.18 versus 0.11 (Appendix B). However, about a quarter of the individual participants 
who did all the relevant judgments had coincidence strength as a better predictor of coincidentality 
than surprise, suggesting that both are relevant, consistent with the combined space (Figure 7). 
As anticipated in the results of Experiment 2 (Figure 6), Bayesian surprise (the log of the likelihood 
ratio divided by the priors ratio) was positively related to judged surprise in this experiment, R2 = 
0.12. The underlying reason for this relatively poor predictiveness was that the (log) likelihoods ratio 
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was only moderately (negatively) related to judged surprise, R2 = 0.11, whereas the sum of the two 
coincidence likelihood judgments was strongly (negatively) related to surprise, R2 = 0.67. And this 
suggests an alternative measure of surprise, data surprise. 
Figure 7. Coincidentality in a space composed of surprise, central panel x-axis, and the log of the 
posteriors ratio, y-axis, for averaged data from Experiment 3, color coded by coincidentality. The 
color coding of coincidentality, blue for low coincidentality and red for high, is shown in relation to 
surprise on the x-axis in the top panel and in relation to the log of coincidence strength (the posterior 
hypothesis belief ratio) on the y-axis in the right panel. 
 
Conceptually, a key aspect of surprising events is that they are unexpected/unanticipated 
from mechanisms known to the individual and, as such, improbable from these perspectives. When 
surprise was high, both coincidence likelihood judgments tended to be low. So a plausible reason 
that the sum of the likelihoods was a good (negatively related) predictor of surprise, and the their 
likelihood ratio was not, is that the two data likelihoods combine additively, after being multiplied by 
respective priors, to give an estimate of the overall probability of the data due to both known 
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hypotheses: cause, pሺ��|��ሻ ∙ pሺCaሻ, and chance, pሺ��|��ሻ ∙ pሺC୦ሻ, in Equation 5. (Note that this 
combined probability of the data is in the denominator of the basic form of Bayes’ theorem, Equation 
1, but gets cancelled out in the process of taking Bayesian ratios, e.g., Equation 2.) Thus, events that 
are unlikely in the context of known causal hypotheses but also unlikely by chance have an overall 
combined probability that is small, and this corresponds to surprise being large. In contrast, if the 
combined probability of the events is near one, surprise should be minimal. This suggests that 
surprise should correspond to 1 divided by the combined probability of the data, Equation 6 left side, 
as this has the desired inverse relationship. In these equations, the k subscripts indicate “known” 
mechanisms for cause and change, that is, mechanisms that are sufficiently well understand and 
applied cognitive mechanisms in the mind of the individual as to generate expectations about what 
will happen in reality. For example, the occurrence of rain in the UK winter generates no surprise 
because of the experienced derived expectation that it’s likely to rain on any given day. This 
formalization has the desired inverse relationship, but when the combined probability of the data due 
to the known hypotheses is one, 1 divided by that probability gives a minimum value of surprise as 1. 
But a more intuitive minimum value of surprise would be 0, the complete absence of surprise, so 
Equation 6 expresses surprise as 1 divided by the overall probability of the data given known causal 
and chance hypotheses minus 1. And this is equivalent to one minus the overall probability of the 
data divided by the probability of the data, as shown in the right-hand side of Equation 6. A useful 
consequence of this is that it puts surprise into an odds ratio form like the odds ratio form for 
coincidence strength (the right-hand side of Equation 3). The judgement scale responses (1 to 100) 
were converted to probabilities by dividing by 101 when calculating data surprise (rather than by 100 
so as to avoid 0’s and 1’s symmetrically). And data surprise was a good predictor of averaged 
surprise, R2 = 0.67. Data surprise can then replace Bayesian surprise in Equation 4 resulting in 
Equation 5. pሺd୩ሻ = pሺ��|��ሻ ∙ pሺCaሻ + pሺ��|��ሻ ∙ pሺC୦ሻ 
Equation 6. ��~ 1୮ሺୢౡሻ − 1 = 1−୮ሺୢౡሻ୮ሺୢౡሻ = DS 
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Equation 7; coincidentality is related to the ratio of two odds ratios, data surprise divided by 
coincidence strength. This corresponds to an updated coincidentality space, in Figure 8, with 
dimensions for data surprise and coincidence strength and coincidentality increasing toward the 
bottom right in the space. 
Equation 7. C∅~C୭sౙaౢ౛ ∙ logୣ [DSCs] +C୭ౣiౚ,         DS ≈ 1 - pሺdkሻ୮ሺdkሻ ,            Cs ≈ ୮ሺ��|�ሻ୮ሺ��|�ሻ = 1−୮ሺ��|�ሻ୮ሺ��|�ሻ   
Overall, surprise and coincidentality were strongly related, consistent with our definition. In 
addition, coincidentality is predicted by surprise and coincidence strength. However, data surprise is 
a better predictor of judged surprise than Bayesian surprise, thus providing more support for our  
Figure 8. Coincidentality space, central panel, composed of log coincidence strength on the y-axis 
and log data surprise on the x-axis for averaged data from Experiment 3. The color coding of 
coincidentality, blue for low coincidentality and red for high, is shown in relation to log data surprise 
on the x-axis in the top panel and in relation to the log of coincidence strength (the posterior 
hypothesis belief ratio) on the y-axis in the right panel.
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definition of coincidence than that of Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2007). To replicate and extend the 
findings from Experiment 3, Experiment 4 used the same hypothesis probability judgments but as a 
fully within-subjects design. 
6. Experiment 4. Coincidentality, Coincidence Strength and Data Surprise 
Coincidence strength (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007), as the balance of support for the causal versus 
chance hypotheses, occurs in our definition as “[coincidences are] ultimately ascribed to change 
since the search for causal mechanisms has not produced anything more plausible than mere 
chance.” Similarly, surprise occurs in our definition as “surprising pattern repetitions ... unlikely by 
chance....” So the practical purpose of this experiment was to measure coincidentality, the two 
posterior and the two likelihood probabilities for the causal and chance hypotheses, as combinations 
of these are sufficient to predict both coincidence strength and surprise within participants. Further, 
having all four terms allows assessment of whether Bayesian surprise (based on Griffiths and 
Tenenbaum, 2007) or data surprise is a better predictor of coincidentality at the level of individual 
participants. Thus, we pit these two formulations of surprise against each other in this experiment. 
6.1 Methods 
6.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-two participants were recruited from a psychology participant panel at Cardiff 
University in exchange for partial course credit. 
6.1.2 Materials, Design and Procedure 
Coincidences, instructions and judgment scales for coincidentality, the causal and chance 
hypothesis posteriors, and the causal and chance likelihoods were the same as Experiment 3. The two 
posteriors were evaluated in a single, combined judgment task where participants provided the causal 
posterior judgment and then the chance posterior judgment for each coincidence in turn. 
Coincidentality and each of the two likelihoods were evaluated in fully separate judgment tasks. 
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6.2 Results and Discussion 
As in prior experiments, coincidence strength was a good predictor of coincidentality for 
averaged data, R2 = 0.59, and for individual (nonreversed) participants, R2 = 0.20 (model details in 
Appendix B). Data surprise was a substantially better predictor of coincidentality than Bayesian 
surprise for averaged data, R2 = 0.72 in Figure 9 versus R2 = 0.40, and a significantly better predictor 
for individual (nonreversed) participants--sign test M(15) = 2, p = 0.007, two-tailed (model fit details 
in Appendix B). The combination of Bayesian surprise and coincidence strength did a reasonable job 
of predicting coincidentality, R2 = 0.59 for averaged data and an average R2 =0.23 for individual 
(nonreversed) participants (Appendix B). However, coincidentality space, as the combination of data 
surprise and coincidence strength in Figure 9, did a substantially better job of predicting 
coincidentality for averaged data, R2 = 0.75, and was a significantly better predictor for individual 
(nonreversed) participants, average R2 = 0.35, sign test M(15) = 2, p = 0.007, two-tailed (model fit 
details in Appendix B). The combination of data surprise with coincidence strength is only a little bit 
better predictor than data surprise by itself, R2 = 0.72 for averaged data and R2 = 0.31 for individual 
(nonreversed) participants; however, there were individual participants for whom coincidence 
strength was a better predictor than data surprise. This along with the previous support for 
coincidence strength (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007) implies that both coincidence strength and data 
surprise are important predictors of coincidentality. Further, this combination is the basis for a new, 
coincidentality space (Figures 8 and 9), the conceptual implications of which are developed below. 
7. General Discussion 
At their core, causal conclusions imply a decision between cause and coincidence, and thus both 
concepts are deeply implicated in learning, reasoning and goal directed behavior (Osman, 2014; 
Johansen & Osman, 2015). While a great deal of prior research has asked, “how causal is this?”, the 
present research has evaluated the nonredundant construct of coincidentality, “how coincidental is 
this?” (The nonequivalence of causality and coincidentality is spelled out below.) The present  
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Figure 9. Coincidentality space, central panels (e.g. bottom left panel), with color coded coincidentality (blue = low coincidentality, red = high), log data 
surprise on the x-axis and log coincidence strength on the y-axis. The color coding of coincidentality is shown versus data surprise, x-axis in the 
adjoining top left panels and versus coincidence strength, y-axis, in the adjoining bottom right panels. Left panels are averaged data and right are 
combined (nonreversed) individual participant data from Experiment 4. Combined data have a small amount of noise jitter to show data density.  
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 research also evaluated an array of possible predictors of coincidentality informed by components in 
our definition of coincidence and supporting that definition: “coincidences are surprising pattern [co-
occurrence] repetitions that are observed to be unlikely by chance but are nonetheless ascribed to 
chance since the search for causal mechanisms has not produced anything more plausible than mere 
chance” (Johansen & Osman, 2015, p. 34). As such, the evaluation of co-occurrence events that are 
ultimately attributed to coincidence is important for understanding causal reasoning because, we 
argue, the same mechanisms underlie both prior to the categorical decision: cause versus 
coincidence. We also argue that the continuous construct of coincidentality, when perceived as high, 
is even more important as a suspicion flag that new causal knowledge may be available. 
Four experiments measured coincidentality for a set of about a 100 naturally occurring 
coincidences that were self-reported personal experiences from an initial diary study. The 
experiments demonstrated that coincidentality is a stable psychological construct with substantial 
levels of agreement between participants and experiments in terms of correspondence with other 
psychological judgment variables. Methodologically it is worth noting that while the diary study 
prospectively collected “coincidences”, fortuitously these included some events which most people 
judge to be causal and hence not coincidences (e.g. the weekend-alarm coincidence, Table 1). 
Across experiments, coincidentality was related to an array of judgments about event 
uncertainty, degree of belief and surprise as psychological constructs, summarized in Figure 10, that 
conceptually align with Bayesian probabilities for the truth of hypotheses given data (posteriors) and 
the probability of data given hypotheses (likelihoods) as discussed in the introduction: 
Coincidentality was negatively related to causal likeliness and positively related to chance likeliness, 
consistent with these being estimates of the posterior belief probabilities for causal and chance 
hypotheses, p(Ca|d) and p(Ch|d); in other words, given the events in the coincidence, what is the 
psychological degree of belief in the causal and chance hypotheses respectively? And this 
corresponds to the implied contrast in support for causal and chance hypotheses in the definition, 
38 
 
“ascribed to chance [p(Ch|d) is large] since the search for causal mechanisms has not produced 
anything [p(Ca|d) is small]….” Further the construct of coincidence strength (Griffiths & 
Tenenbaum, 2007)—as relative belief in the causal and chance hypotheses, the ratio of these 
posteriors beliefs, p(Ca|d)/p(Ch|d)—was negatively related to coincidentality, the higher the relative 
belief in the causal over the chance hypothesis the lower coincidentality. However, unlike the 
posterior hypothesis beliefs which had opposing relationships with coincidentality, judgments of 
coincidence likelihood given causal and chance hypotheses, p(d|Ca) and p(d|Ch), were both 
negatively related to coincidentality. So the difference in the positive relationship between 
Figure 10. Summary of key relationships found between judged coincidentality and its predictors. 
See main text for details. 
 
coincidentality and the chance posterior belief, p(Ch|d), versus the negative relationship between 
coincidentality and the chance likelihood estimate, p(d|Ch), is consistent with the definition of 
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coincidences as events that are “unlikely by chance [p(d|Ch) is small] but nonetheless ascribed to 
chance [p(Ch|d) is large]….” Furthermore, these two hypothesis beliefs and two data likelihoods can 
be used to specify all three Bayesian ratios contrasting causal and chance hypotheses (Equation 2 in 
the Introduction); the posterior belief ratio, p(Ca|d)/p(Ch|d); the data likelihoods ratio, 
p(d|Ca)/p(d|Ch), and the inferred prior belief ratio, p(Ca)/p(Ch). Moreover, this allows 
coincidentality to be represented in Griffiths & Tenenbaum’s (2007) coincidence strength space 
(Figure 1) composed of the prior beliefs and data likelihoods ratios (Experiment 2) as well as in a 
rotated coincidence strength space composed of coincidence strength, p(Ca|d)/p(Ch|d), and Bayesian 
surprise (Experiments 2, 3 and 4). Coincidentality was positively related to Bayesian surprise as the 
contrast between the data likelihoods ratio and prior beliefs ratio, that is as a ratio of these two ratios, 
[p(d|Ca)/p(d|Ch)]/[ p(Ca)/p(Ch)]. In addition, coincidentality was, consistent with the definition, 
strongly positively related to judged surprise (Experiment 3), and judged surprise was positively 
related to Bayesian surprise (Experiment 3); however, surprise was better predicted by data surprise 
than Bayesian surprise (Experiment 3) where data surprise is an odds ratio, [1 – p(dk)]/p(dk), based 
on the overall probability of the data, p(dk), in the context of the known cause and chance 
hypotheses. Finally, consistent with both surprise and relative support for the causal and chance 
hypotheses in the definition, coincidentality is well predicted by Equation 7 as conceptualized in a 
space composed of data surprise and coincidence strength (Experiments 3 and 4). Taken together, 
these predictors support our definition of coincidence and provide a way of answering the key 
question, how coincidental is this? 
Not only are data surprise and coincidence strength predictors of coincidentality, the ratio 
Ds/Cs in Equation 7, they represent two conceptual constraints on coincidentality as reflected in 
where judgment data points do and don’t tend to occur: Although averaged data obscure this 
(because they represent only central tendency), the combined data plots in Figures 2 and 9 show it; 
coincidence strength, in the bottom of the ratio, corresponds to a kind of maximum conceptual 
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boundary on coincidentality, Figure 9 far right panel, such that when coincidence strength is 
sufficiently high coincidentality must be low; put simply, co-occurrences that are clearly the result of 
a known causal connection are not coincidences. Data surprise, in the top of the ratio, corresponds to 
essentially the opposite constraint in terms of a kind of minimum bound on coincidentality such that 
when data surprise is sufficiently high, coincidentality must be at least somewhat high; i.e. surprising 
co-occurrence events are unexpected, that is not well anticipated from known causal and chance 
hypotheses and are unlikely in the context of both. This corresponds to surprising co-occurrences 
being at least somewhat coincidental because if either a causal hypothesis or chance were perceived 
to be likely true the events wouldn’t be surprising anymore; events with clear, known explanations 
don’t usually remain surprising (Foster & Keane, 2015; 2019; Maguire, et al., 2019; Schmidhuber, 
2009). Importantly, these two constraints and the corresponding ratio of data surprise divided 
coincidence strength support a broader conceptual interpretation of the answer to the question, how 
coincidental is this? 
 The final empirical form of the model, Equation 7 composed of a ratio of the odds ratios for 
data surprise and coincidence strength, has a broader conceptual implication as shown in Equation 8; 
it indicates the extent of the support for the possibility that some unknown, as yet unconsidered, 
causal mechanism was responsible for the surprising co-incidence. The basic intuition here for an 
experienced co-incidence is that if the probability of the known causal mechanism under 
consideration is sufficiently small, then that might be enough to reject that causal mechanism and 
favor chance if the probability due to chance is reasonably large, i.e. “just a chance co-occurrence”. 
This corresponds to relative posterior belief in the chance hypothesis over the known cause 
hypothesis, the posterior belief ratio being close to zero and the log ratio being negative. But what if 
the probability of the co-incidence is also extremely unlikely due to chance and the posterior chance 
hypothesis belief probability is also small? For some co-incidences of this kind, the posterior belief 
ratio could still have a value reasonably close to zero indicating that there was more support for the 
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chance hypothesis than the known cause hypothesis. However, that might not correspond to 
compelling support for the chance hypothesis if the overall probability of the data in the context of 
both known cause and chance hypotheses, p(dk) Equation 5, is sufficiently small because that starts 
to lead to the suspicion that some as yet unknown/unconsidered causal mechanism was responsible 
for the surprising co-incidence. Essentially this corresponds to extending the hypothesis space from 
hypotheses for known things—known causal mechanisms and chance, the first two terms in equation 
9—to include an unknown cause hypothesis with a probability nontrivially greater than zero, the 
third term in Equation 9. 
Equation 8. logୣ [( p(ౙ¬ౡ|��)ቀ1−p(ౙ¬ౡ|��)ቁ)( p(��|��)ቀ1−p(��|��)ቁ) ] ~�∅~logୣ [୫axሺ��ሻ୫୧୬ሺ��ሻ] = logୣ [(
1−p(��)p(��) )(p(��|��)p(��|��))] = logୣ [(
1−ቀ�(��|��)∙�ሺ��ሻ+�(��|��)∙�(��)ቁ�(��|��)∙�ሺ��ሻ+�(��|��)∙�(��) )(�(��|��)∙�ሺ��ሻ�(��|��)∙�(��)) ] 
Equation 9. {pሺ��|��ሻ + pሺ��|��ሻ} + pሺC¬୩|��ሻ = 1 
Equation 10. pሺdሻ   = pሺ��|��ሻ ∙ pሺCaሻ + pሺ��|��ሻ ∙ pሺC୦ሻ + pሺd¬୩|C¬aሻ ∙ pሺC¬aሻ 
Equation 11. 1 − pሺd୩ሻ = pሺd¬୩|C¬aሻ ∙ pሺC¬aሻ 
Put another way, this implied discrepancy (as a kind of randomness deficiency, Li & Vitányi, 
2019; Maguire, et al., 2019) between the actually occurring co-incidence and the probability of that 
co-incidence in the context of the known cause and chance hypotheses is just too great for either one 
to be plausible when that probability of the data is very small. But the discrepancy can be reduced by 
the operation of an unknown causal mechanism which at least conceptually makes the observed co-
occurrence more likely. To emphasize, this is not about jumping to definite conclusions about the 
existence of some new causal mechanism, like a believer might do, or dismissing the possibility of a 
new mechanism, like a skeptic might do, but rather having sufficient suspicion to seek out more 
evidence, like a scientist would do. 
As discussed above, co-occurrence surprise corresponds to a co-incidence being substantially 
unexpected by known cause and chance. So surprise is related to the discrepancy between 1 and the 
probability of the data from known cause and chance: the higher the known probability of the data, 
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the smaller the numerator of data surprise in Equation 6, the bigger the denominator and the smaller 
the data odds ratio and the smaller the surprise.  But if the probability of the data for known 
mechanisms is small, the discrepancy between that probability and 1 in the numerator is large, the 
odds ratio is large and surprise is high. Conceptually then the 1 in the numerator of data surprise 
corresponds to the overall probability of the data occurring as a result of both known mechanisms 
(cause and chance) and unknown mechanisms, p(d) in Equation 10, being as (hypothetically) high as 
it possibly can be, i.e. one, and this corresponds to surprise being as high as it can be. However, 
there’s no reason why the probability of the data via all possible mechanisms has to be a certainty, 
one. The true overall probability of the data even with the possibility of the unknown cause operating 
might very well be less than 1. If the 1 in the numerator of data surprise is replaced by the unknown 
p(d), the overall probability of the data for both known (cause and chance) and unknown 
mechanisms, then data surprise on the right hand side of Equation 8, is equivalent to the odds ratio 
supporting the probability of an unknown cause hypothesis, p(c¬k|dk), on the left hand side. And as 
the coincidence strength ratio composed of the known causal hypothesis divided by the chance 
hypothesis is also equivalent to the odds ratio for the known cause, the model composed of data 
surprise and coincidence strength is equivalent to a conceptual model of the odds ratio for the 
unknown cause divided the odds ratio for the known cause.  
Unlike coincidence strength based on known mechanisms, this ratio of odds ratios is not an 
estimate of the probability that an unknown causal mechanism is operating but an indication of the 
maximal amount of support there might be for such a mechanism, Equation 11. The essential reason 
for this is that the overall probably of the data, p(d), is unknown because it includes the unknown 
probability of the data due to an unknown causal mechanism. But still the highest the probability of 
the data can be is one. So data surprise is an estimate of maximum suspicion, Equation 11, that is an 
indicate of what the highest estimated probability of the unknown cause hypothesis can reasonably 
be given the data, the third term in equation 9. On the other hand, coincidence strength based solely 
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on known mechanisms represents a kind of minimum suspicion that an unknown mechanism might 
be operating. So coincidentality represents, not the true probability of an unknown causal hypothesis, 
but rather a ratio of the maximum to minimum support values that a new mechanism might be 
operating and hence a good suspicion trigger to gather more evidence. It is also worth noting that this 
final conceptualization, while not identical to the definition of coincidence proposed by Griffiths and 
Tenenbaum (2007), is similar in terms of a contrast between standard and nonstandard accounts. 
In a more intuitive spatial form, coincidentality as related to causal discovery can be 
represented in a space composed of data surprise and coincidence strength, Figure 11. The left-hand 
side of the space corresponds to data surprise being low with the conclusion determined by 
coincidence strength, known causes in the top left quadrant or known chance in the bottom left 
quadrant. If coincidence strength favors cause over chance but data surprise is still high, the top 
right-hand quadrant, then it’s possible that that known causes apply, though not necessarily probable. 
But if coincidence strength is low and data surprise is high, the bottom right hand quadrant, then this 
invokes the possibility that a new mechanism might be operating, and more strongly so toward the 
bottom right hand of the space. This is where great scientific discoveries exist along with very weird, 
improbable coincidences (for examples of both see Johansen & Osman, 2015). So when faced with a 
new co-incidence which of these is the right interpretation for a given context is only likely to be 
decided by subsequent evaluation and evidence. But this coincidentality ratio of ratios provides a 
quantitative estimate of the potential for a new causal mechanism and as such can be a guide for 
which merit further evaluation and which don’t. So while we are proposing a psychological theory of 
coincidences, central to this perspective is the assessment of uncertain belief and data surprise 
probabilities, and these, we argue from the Bayesian perspective, cannot be too inaccurate or 
fundamental mechanisms for co-incidence perception in causal discovery wouldn’t work. 
Despite the conventional wisdom in judgment and decision making that people are bad at 
probabilities, Bayesian perspectives have argued the opposite. Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) 
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showed that peoples’ judgments about a range of real phenomena are reasonably accurate and 
consistent with underlying Bayesian probabilities. Lewandowsky, Griffiths and Kalish (2009) used 
an iterated design to argue that people update their judgments in an optimal Bayesian way, even for 
impoverished data. And the close correspondence between probability estimates and Bayesian 
models has been shown in children as young 4-5 years old (e.g. Denison, Bonawitz, Gopnik, & 
Griffiths, 2013). Not surprisingly, the Bayesian optimality perspective has been critiqued as for 
example Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, (2014) argue that people trade off decision accuracy against the  
Figure 11. Causal discovery in coincidentality space composed of (log) coincidence strength, y-axis, 
and (log) data surprise, x-axis, as in Figure 9. The large gray arrow corresponds to coincidentality 
increasing toward the bottom right-hand side of the space, as per equation 7. Details in main text. 
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effort of obtaining data, so on an individual basis, judgments can seem more noisy and sub-optimal 
but globally approximate Bayesian optimality. In the present context, whether or not probability 
estimates are optimal in a Bayesian sense, we argue for a less strong conclusion for coincidences: 
people have some ability to discriminate the merely improbable from the extremely unlikely. 
Coincidence perception and causal discovery are related psychological phenomena associated with at 
least somewhat accurate assessments of improbability, particularly in the context of chance. 
Probability judgment can’t be that defective or causal reasoning would be impossible; to 
draw a causal conclusion from data, a scientist needs to be able to distinguish between extremities 
probabilities of the data being due to chance, the unlikely from the extremely unlikely; one or two 
co-occurrences may be easily attributed to chance, while 100 such co-occurrences may have such a 
vanishingly small probability by chance as to compellingly support the causal hypothesis. The ability 
to assess something as “unlikely by chance” can’t be too bad or its difficult to see how scientists 
could ever be entitled to draw causal conclusions from empirical data, at least in the absence of 
formal statistical calculations, as the chance hypothesis could never be compellingly eliminated. 
Collecting more data has to drive the implied probability of the data by chance to such a low value 
that the chance hypothesis can be discarded in favor of the causal hypothesis as an addition to causal 
knowledge or when would enough data actually be enough data? So not only is the ability to assess 
improbability-by-chance at the heart of causal search, it is at the heart of causal knowledge as well. 
As an example, one of the greatest empirical observations of all time is Fleming’s discovery 
of the antibiotic properties of penicillin mold. Fleming was a biologist who was specifically looking 
for substances that would kill disease causing bacteria; so he was very much in targeted causal search 
mode. Penicillin mold is fairly common in human environments because it grows easily on bread, 
but needless to say, bacteriologists have always gone to some lengths to keep their cultures from 
being contaminated by things other than the bacteria they want to study. The basic idea of culturing 
bacteria is that to study a particular kind of bacteria they need to be “grown” in pure form. So a 
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bacterial culture essentially consists of a support medium and chemicals that either help the bacteria 
multiply or don’t and they die off. The problem for bacteriologists is that cultures get contaminated 
by undesirable things all the time, and such contaminated cultures get discarded. The interesting 
aspect of this discovery isn’t that a culture serendipitously happened to get contaminated by 
penicillin mold (you may have some growing in your kitchen) but rather that Fleming noticed. And 
in the context of co-incidences it is worth considering what he noticed: In simplistic terms bacteria in 
cultures do two basic things, they grow (multiply) and they die. Because most bacteria are extremely 
small, a relatively young bacterial culture as seen by the naked eye includes some spatial regions 
where bacteria are clearly growing and some where they aren’t. There are two basic explanations for 
why bacteria aren’t clearly growing in a specific region: One reason is just chance. That is, when a 
culture is “seeded” with bacteria, exactly where in space growths appear has a random component to 
it resulting from the underlying random positions of individual bacteria. A known causal reason for 
why bacteria aren’t clearly growing at a particular spatial position can be that the nutrients in that 
location have already been used up or possibly never existed. Essentially what Fleming must have 
noticed was the spatial co-incidence of contaminant growth and culture death. Because of the 
random component for exactly where things grow in a culture for both the contaminant and the 
bacteria being cultured, it is mathematically possibly that the spatial co-incidence of the two 
occurred by chance.  While it is challenging to specify this probability exactly, what is clear is that it 
was fairly small. In fact, it seems incredibly implausible that Fleming even considered the possibility 
that the surprising spatial co-incidence was due to chance. Far more plausibly, he formed the 
suspicion that a new causal mechanism was operating because it was the kind of mechanism he was 
looking for. He and other scientists then went on to amass overwhelming evidence for this 
mechanism. In broader terms, peoples’ probability judgments may not be perfectly accurate, but they 
can’t be too poor. More importantly, the skeptical view that most chance events will occur given 
enough time and people misses the point (see the summary of this perspective in Johansen & Osman, 
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2015): People are sometimes capable of recognizing the extreme improbability of some co-
incidences when they see them and sometimes go on to make new causal discoveries as a result. The 
construct of coincidentality in Equation 8 provides an explicit approach to deciding when further 
evaluation is warranted, i.e. when known cause and chance mechanisms aren’t judged plausible.     
The present research has also provided partial support for Griffiths and Tenenbaum’s (2007) 
Bayesian ratio perspective as an account of coincidentality while also flagging a limitation of this 
perspective: The conceptual limitation of the Bayesian ratios perspective is that it is based on 
Bayesian odds ratios where the unknown overall probability of the data (in the denominator of the 
basic form Bayes’ theorem, Equation 1), occurs in both the numerator and the denominator 
respectively for the two hypotheses under consideration and so gets cancelled out, Equation 2. Thus, 
the Bayesian odds ratio form using the posterior hypothesis probabilities effectively treats the 
component probabilities as relative to each other rather than absolute. That is, the posterior odds 
ratio quantifies the relative extent to which one hypothesis is favored over the other, e.g. if the 
posterior causal hypothesis given the data has a probability of 0.8 and the chance hypothesis 0.1 then 
the posteriors odds ratio 0.8/0.08 = 10 says there is 10 times more support for the causal hypothesis 
than the chance hypothesis. In some respects, this emphasis on relative support makes perfect sense 
because the overall probability of the data in the denominator of Bayes’ theorem is commonly 
unknown. There’s always a chance that some unconsidered mechanism was responsible, so 
conceptually this should be included in the overall probability of the data except its value is 
unknown. This absolute uncertainty about the overall probability of the data may seem irrelevant 
when the goal is to evaluate the relative hypothesis support in terms of Bayesian posteriors ratio. But 
the reason the overall probability of the data matters is that the interpretation of a given Bayesian 
posteriors ratio, say 10, changes quite dramatically depending on this probability: If the overall 
probability of the data from known causal mechanisms and chance is high, then a posteriors ratio of 
10 provides quite compelling support for the specified causal hypothesis (as in the example above). 
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But a Bayesian posteriors ratio of 10 can also arise out of absolute posterior probabilities that are 
extremely small, e.g. 0.0000000001/0.00000000001 = 10. In this case the appropriate conclusion is 
not that this posteriors ratio of 10 provides reasonably compelling support for the specified causal 
hypothesis over the chance hypothesis, but rather than neither of the hypotheses in hand is very 
strongly supported and some as yet unknown mechanism might be in operation. That is, some 
unknown mechanism is needed to account for the occurrence of the data and thus make the overall, 
conceptually expected probability of the observed pattern more consistent with the actual events. 
 In broader terms, the present research contributes to but also highlights the need for a better 
specification of a normative conceptualization of coincidence evaluation as an intrinsic part of causal 
reasoning and discovery. Historically causal discovery, especially via the mechanisms of science, has 
been an predominantly human, psychological activity; however the rise of computer automation and 
various kinds of artificial intelligence, especially machine learning, strongly suggest these will play 
an increasing role in the scientific process in terms of both large scale data acquisition and causal 
reasoning based on that data. But it is also very plausible that the development of this automation 
will be and should be informed by the psychological evaluation of how people make causal 
discoveries (Fenton & Neil, 2012). The specification of how people normatively ought to engage in 
causal reasoning is going to be strongly informed by how they actually do causal reasoning given the 
prior success of science (Pearl, 2019). 
In conclusion, coincidences provide an important perspective on the mechanisms of causal 
reasoning and as such the concept of coincidentality is central to the mechanisms of causal learning 
operating in individuals, science and society. That is, coincidentality is a cognitive marker that new 
causal knowledge might be available. In short, coincidentality as “how coincidental is this?” is a 
cognitive analogue for an ancient map’s “here be dragons!” in regions of uncertainty; the risk averse 
shy away, but the bold learn. 
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Appendix A: data tabulation and analysis 
A.1. Handling of missing, ambiguous and repetitive responses 
Across all experiments, the tabulation of the data for presentation in the figures involved 
removing ambiguous data points, e.g. 606, that were not actually on the judgment scales (1 to 100). 
There were only a handful of off-scale data points across all the experiments with the exception that 
there were quite a few 0 responses even though technically the minimum scale value was 1. As the 
difference between a 0 versus a 1 is minute in terms of presented data in figures, these 0’s were left 
as 0’s for data in the figures for accuracy. Similarly, across experiments, participants occasionally 
failed to provide individual judgments in a given task and these missing data points were simply not 
included in the data in figures. 
The tabulated averaged data for model evaluation was identical to the averaged data 
presented in the figures. However, the tabulation of the data for evaluating models on individual 
participants handled missing and out of range values somewhat differently: 0 judgments were 
replaced with 1 judgments to keep various models from collapsing predictions to zero. Other missing 
and out of range judgments were replaced with participant-wise averages of the judgments they did 
supply in a given judgment task so as to be as theoretically neutral as possible while still allowing the 
models to be fully applied to each individual data set.  In addition, a handful of participants across 
the entire set of experiments reported made repetitive responses to most or all items in a given 
judgment task, e.g. making coincidentality judgments of 100 for all items. These participants 
judgments are presented in the figures, but these participants were not evaluated when fitting models 
to individual participants as there was no variance in the judgments for the models to account for. 
Lastly participants occasionally failed to provide any judgments in a given judgment task, e.g. 
because they ran out of time. These partial data sets are included in the figures but again the models 
were not applied to these individual participants because none of the judgments in a given task were 
present. 
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A.2. Handling of judgment scale reversals 
Scale reversals occurred for a minority of participants in all the experiments reported here. 
Correlation matrices provide a compact way of showing when participants probably reversed 
particular judgment scales. Figure A.1 shows the correlation matrices for each judgment task in 
every experiment. Each matrix shows the correlation between each individual participant to each 
other individual participant in that task as indicated by a cell in the matrix that is either black, a 
correlation between a pair of participants more negative than r = -0.1, or white indicating a 
correlation greater than r = -0.1. Thus each individual row (also each column) indicates how a given 
participant’s judgments related to all other individual participants in that task. Systematic judgment 
scale reversals flag up in terms of systematic negative correlations to other individual participants, 
that is as horizontal (and vertical) black lines. Further, scale reversed participants tended to be 
positively correlated with each other corresponding to white boxes where black horizontal and 
vertical lines intersect. As can be seen, scale reversals clearly occurred in all judgment tasks, but 
only for a relatively small minority of participants in any given task. Thus the dominant 
interpretation of each scale was used by the substantial majority of participants, and the final 
experiment, Experiment 4, had especially few apparent reversals. 
Figure A1. Correlation matrices with correlations between individual participants for each of the 
main judgment tasks (rows of panels) in each experiment (columns of panels). Each row (and each 
column) in a given matrix corresponds to the correlations between a given participant’s judgments in 
a task for all 97 coincidences individually to the judgments from each other participant. Black cells 
correspond to a negative correlation coefficients (r) less than or equal to (i.e. more negative than) -
0.1, and white cells to correlations bigger than this. 
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Appendix B: model procedures and model fit details 
Model free parameters were adjusted (via hill-climbing and/or simulated annealing) to 
minimize a fit function of the disparity between the model predictions and the data. This fit function 
was either sum-squared error (SSE) or weighted sum-squared error (wSSE). Note that in the main 
text the SSE fits are reported in terms of percentage of variance accounted for, R2. The weightings 
used in wSSE were 1 divided by the variance of the mean for a given coincidence, i.e. the sample 
variance of the coincidentality judgments for that coincidence divided by the number of such 
judgments, when fitting averaged data, and 1 divided the coincidence variance estimated from a 
variance model when fitting individual participant data sets.  
The variance model is needed to provide variance estimates for individual participant 
judgments that occurred outside of the range of the averaged judgments, i.e. although individual 
participants gave coincidentality judgments of 100, none of the coincidentality judgments averaged 
across participants were this extreme, so a variance model was needed to provide variance estimates 
for such judgments. The variance model was a parabola, x*(100-x) multiplied by a variance scaling 
coefficient that was fitted to the coincidence sample variances as a function the coincidence means 
for a give experiment with an added minimum variance intercept of 1. When a model made a 
prediction beyond the range of the judgment scale, it was associated with a variance estimate 
corresponding to the nearest value on the judgment scale. The variance model had the effect of 
smoothing out differences in the coincidences variance for a given range of coincidentality 
judgments as well as providing smaller variance estimates for judgments toward the ends of the 
judgment range. Overall, while we have included wSSE fits in the interests of completeness, the 
differences between SSE and wSSE fits across models and data sets were generally very small, with 
both supporting the same conclusions. 
Best fitting model parameters and fit values for all models and data sets discussed in the main 
text are in the tables below by experiment. The SSE fits are in the left columns and the wSSE fits are 
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in the right columns. Note that the percentage of variance accounted for in the wSSE fits is the 
unweighted percentage of variance. Thus the generally minute decline in percentage of variance for 
wSSE fits compared to SSE fits shows that the weighted and unweighted fits were generally very 
similar. 
Table B.1. Experiment 1 modeling results. Log inverse coincidence strength model (Equation 3) fit 
summary for averaged data, first row, and the average of individual participant fits, second row, 
based on sum-squared error (SSE), left columns, and weighted sum-squared error (wSSE), right 
columns 
 SSE fits    wSSE fits   
 % var SSE CoScale CoMid % var wSSE CoScale CoMid 
Averaged 0.698 1779 16.6 45.2 0.697 70.0 17.0 45.2 
Individual 0.264 33631 8.2 48.0 0.247 44.6 6.9 48.2 
 
Table B.2. Experiment 2 modeling results. Log inverse coincidence strength model fit summary for 
averaged data, first row, and log Bayesian surprise model, second row, based on sum-squared error 
(SSE), left columns, and weighted sum-squared error (wSSE), right columns. The third row is the 
combined log coincidence strength and Bayesian surprise model (Equation 4). 
 
 
 SSE fits    wSSE fits    
model % var SSE CsScale SuScale CoMid % var wSSE CsScale SuScale CoMid 
Ln Cs 0.530 4902 17.3  44.6 0.523 286.8 18.8  44.5 
Ln Bs 0.490 5312  11.3 40.0 0.486 330.2  12.0 39.8 
Ln[Bs/Cs] 0.545 4739 11.8 4.3 42.4 0.538 280.4 14.3 3.4 42.7 
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Table B.3. Experiment 3 model results. Log inverse coincidence strength model fit summary for 
averaged data, first row, and individual participants, second row, based on sum-squared error (SSE), 
left columns, and weighted sum-squared error (wSSE), right columns. The judged surprise model 
(Su) is in rows three and four, and an combined surprise and log inverse coincidence strength model, 
rows five and six (Equation 4). The models in the top rows are all models of coincidentality. The two 
models in the bottom rows, log Bayesian surprise and log data surprise, are models predicting judged 
surprise rather than coincidentality.  
Coincidentality SSE   fits    wSSE fits 
models   %var SSE CsScale SuScale CoMid %var wSSE CsScl SuScl CoMid 
(log 1/Cs) avg 0.477 2599 16.7  46.8 0.476 175.9 16.6  47.0 
 ind 0.109 3026 4.0  51.3 0.097 48.5 3.3  51.1 
Su avg 0.803 976  0.700 23.6 0.803 67.2  0.705 23.4 
 ind 0.183 31463  0.375 36.0 0.172 47.9  0.334 37.5 
Su+log 1/Cs avg 0.836 816 5.5 0.592 25.5 0.836 55.8 5.6 0.595 25.3 
 ind 0.187 27184 2.8 0.224 41.4 0.172 43.7 2.4 0.229 41.7 
Models of            
surprise            
Log Bs (avg) avg 0.119 7179  9.2 41.7 0.119 586.1  10.4 40.1 
Log Ds (avg) ind 0.671 2677  30.0 45.0 0.670 221.7  30.6 44.6 
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Table B.4. Experiment 4 modeling results. Models of coincidentality: log inverse coincidence 
strength model fit summary for averaged data, first row, and the average of individual participant 
fits, second row, based on sum-squared error (SSE), left columns, and weighted sum-squared error 
(wSSE), right columns. Log Bayesian surprise (log Bs) is in rows three and four. Log Data surprise 
(log Ds) is in rows five and six. The combined model of log Bayesian surprise and log inverse 
coincidence strength (log Bs/Cs), rows seven and eight. The combined model of log data surprise 
and log inverse coincidence strength (Equation 7), rows nine and ten. 
   SSE   fits    wSSE fits 
   %var SSE CsScale SuScale CoMid %var wSSE CsScl SuScl CoMid 
(log 1/Cs) avg 0.588 3676 15.3  42.3 0.580 149.4 17.0  41.5 
 ind 0.201 31533 5.8  49.6 0.187 57.5 4.9  50.2 
Log Bs avg 0.404 5316  17.3 36.1 0.401 238.4  18.3 35.3 
 ind 0.157 34818  3.3 49.7 0.142 61.9  3.0 49.9 
Log Ds avg 0.722 2479  26.1 43.3 0.719 109.3  27.5 43.0 
 ind 0.306 27873  10.2 48.5 0.275 53.1  8.5 48.9 
Log Bs/Cs avg 0.588 3672 14.7 0.95 41.8 0.579 149.4 17.2 -0.4 41.7 
 ind 0.231 30638 4.0 1.3 48.8 0.217 55.9 3.2 1.3 49.3 
Log Ds/Cs avg 0.748 2248 5.2 19.8 42.0 0.742 95.7 6.6 19.6 41.6 
 ind 0.352 25374 2.7 8.5 46.1 0.337 47.8 2.5 7.3 47.1 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Coincidence strength, the posteriors belief ratio for the causal and chance hypotheses, in 
Bayes’ space. The x-axis is the log of the data likelihoods ratio for the causal and chance hypotheses 
respectively. The y-axis is the log of the priors ratio of beliefs in the causal and chance hypotheses 
respectively. The blue arrow indicates increasing coincidence strength. See main text for details. 
Figure adapted partly from Figure 2 in Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2007). 
Figure 2. Average coincidentality versus the ratio of the average causal likeliness (Ca|d) to the 
average chance likeliness (Ch|d), top panel, and combined plots of all nonreversed participants’ 
judgments, bottom panels, from Experiment 1. Error bars are standard error. Note that the left bottom 
panel is a magnification of the right bottom panel for posterior ratios between 0 and 5. The trend line 
is logarithmic. Red circles are the blond-guy coincidence and blue squares are the weekend-alarm 
coincidence from Table 1. A small amount of noise jitter has been added to the data points in this and 
subsequent combined data panels to more clearly convey data density.   
Figure 3. Coincidentality versus each of the four probability judgments--the causal and chance 
posteriors and the causal and chance likelihoods--for averaged judgments from Experiment 2. Error 
bars are standard error. Trendlines are linear with percentage of variance accounted for. Red circles 
are the blond-guy coincidence and blue squares are the weekend-alarm coincidence from Table 1. 
Figure 4. Average coincidentality color coded in Bayes’ space (Figure 1) composed of the log of the 
priors ratios of the averages, y-axis, and the log of the likelihoods ratios of the averages, the x-axis of 
the central panel, for data from Experiment 2. The top panel shows the color coding of 
coincidentality, y-axis, in relation to the log likelihoods ratio, the x-axis, red is most coincidental and 
blue is least. And the right panel shows a similar coding of coincidentality for the priors ratio. Large 
Red circles are the blond-guy coincidence, and large blue squares are the weekend-alarm coincidence 
from Table 1. 
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Figure 5. Bayesian surprise as the extent of the disagreement between the prior belief and data 
likelihoods ratios the y and x axes respectively in the Bayes’ space from Figure 1 in the Introduction. 
Figure 6. Average coincidentality from Experiment 2 color coded in rotated Bayes’ space, with the 
log of Bayesian surprise on the x-axis and log coincidence strength on the y-axis of the central panel. 
The color coding of coincidentality, blue for low coincidentality and red for high, is shown in 
relation to log Bayesian surprise on the x-axis in the top panel and in relation to the log posteriors 
ratio on the y-axis in the right panel. Large Red circles are the blond-guy coincidence, and large blue 
squares are the weekend-alarm coincidence from Table 1. 
Figure 7. Coincidentality in a space composed of surprise, central panel x-axis, and the log of the 
posteriors ratio, y-axis, for averaged data from Experiment 3, color coded by coincidentality. The 
color coding of coincidentality, blue for low coincidentality and red for high, is shown in relation to 
surprise on the x-axis in the top panel and in relation to the log of coincidence strength (the posterior 
hypothesis belief ratio) on the y-axis in the right panel. 
Figure 8. Coincidentality space, central panel, composed of log coincidence strength on the y-axis 
and log data surprise on the x-axis for averaged data from Experiment 3. The color coding of 
coincidentality, blue for low coincidentality and red for high, is shown in relation to log data surprise 
on the x-axis in the top panel and in relation to the log of coincidence strength (the posterior 
hypothesis belief ratio) on the y-axis in the right panel. 
Figure 9. Coincidentality space, central panels (e.g. bottom left panel), with color coded 
coincidentality (blue = low coincidentality, red = high), log data surprise on the x-axis and log 
coincidence strength on the y-axis. The color coding of coincidentality is shown versus data surprise, 
x-axis in the adjoining top left panels and versus coincidence strength, y-axis, in the adjoining 
bottom right panels. Left panels are averaged data and right are combined (nonreversed) individual 
participant data from Experiment 4. Combined data have a small amount of noise jitter to show data 
density.  
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Figure 10. Summary of key relationships found between judged coincidentality and its predictors. 
See main text for details. 
Figure 11. Causal discovery in coincidentality space composed of (log) coincidence strength, y-axis, 
and (log) data surprise, x-axis, as in Figure 9. The large gray arrow corresponds to coincidentality 
increasing toward the bottom right-hand side of the space, as per equation 7. Details in main text. 
Figure A1. Correlation matrices with correlations between individual participants for each of the 
main judgment tasks (rows of panels) in each experiment (columns of panels). Each row (and each 
column) in a given matrix corresponds to the correlations between a given participant’s judgments in 
a task for all 97 coincidences individually to the judgments from each other participant. Black cells 
correspond to a negative correlation coefficients (r) less than or equal to (i.e. more negative than) -
0.1, and white cells to correlations bigger than this. 
 
